Growlers for Growlers

The suggestion that the US could acquire two S-400 systems from Turkey has been unsurprisingly opposed by Russia. Such an acquisition could yield the US and her allies a treasure trove of intelligence.

A mooted plan for the US to buy S-400 SAM systems from Turkey could prompt a ELINT bonanza.

Senator John Thune, a Republican Senator from South Dakota has proposed that the US purchase the Almaz-Antey S-400 (NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler) long-range/high-altitude Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems that Turkey procured from Russia.

In 2017 Turkey procured two S-400 systems, a total of four battalions, for $2.4 billion with deliveries commencing in 2019. This threw a spanner in the works of plans by the Türk Hava Kuvvetleri (THK/Turkish Air Force) to acquire Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning-II combat aircraft.

A total of 120 aircraft were expected to be acquired before the acquisition was cancelled by the administration of President Donald Trump in July 2019. The administration was concerned that the S-400’s sensors, principally its ground-based air defence and fire control radars, could collect sensitive information regarding the F-35A’s radar cross section and electromagnetic emissions.

The cancellation of the acquisition resulted in the four THK F-35As delivered to Luke airbase, Arizona, being rerolled to furnish the US Air Force.

Nyet from Moscow

Mr. Thune suggested that the US acquisition of both S-400 systems would remove them from Turkey and hence THK control allowing F-35A deliveries to continue. Russian lawmakers protested the proposal with Leonid Slutsky, chair of the Russian Duma (parliament) committee on international affairs, condemning Mr. Thune’s proposal as “unprincipled and cynical.”

It seems unlikely that such a purchase will occur in the near term. Such a move by Ankara would make Moscow hopping mad. Yet such a purchase by the US would offer serious benefits.

Intelligent Decision

Aside from resuming F-35A deliveries to Turkey, it would give the United States Air Force, and US armed forces in general, once of the world’s most advanced air defence systems to pour over at their leisure.

The US Department of Defence already possesses a smorgasbord of Soviet-era SAMs and ground-based air surveillance and fire control/ground-controlled interception radars. These have been sourced from a myriad of ex-Warsaw Pact countries. They are routinely used to provide realistic threats during US-based international air exercises like Red Flag.

The US Navy and USAF are both overhauling their Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (S/DEAD) postures. The US Navy is deploying the Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic warfare and S/DEAD aircraft, along with Northrop Grumman’s AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radar Guided Missile, a  variant of the venerable AGM-88 HARM (High Speed Anti-Radar Missile) family. The US Air Force is optimising the F-35A to perform S/DEAD using Northrop Grumman’s AGM-88F HCS (HARM Control System) AGM-88 variant.

US and allied aircraft operating over Syria have flown in airspace thought to be protected by the S-400. Russia has deployed two systems to the northwest of the country since 2015.

However, there is doubt in some quarters of the NATO electronic warfare community as to whether either system has been activated in full for fear that Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) regarding their 91N6 (NATO reporting name Big Bird) S-band (2.3 gigahertz/GHz to 2.5GHz/2.7GHz to 3.7GHz) and 96L6E (NATO reporting name Cheese Board) C-band (5.25GHz to 5.925GHz) early warning and target acquisition radar could be hoovered up by US and NATO ELINT aircraft.

For all intents and purposes much of the S-400’s design and capabilities remain a mystery. No wonder Moscow is nervous about NATO getting its hands on a couple.

New Signals Intelligence Platforms for Republic of Korea Air Force

The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) could spend up to $725 million on new SIGINT aircraft between now and 2026.

Plans were approved by Republic of Korea’s Defence Project Promotion Committee (DPPC) on 26th June to acquire new Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) platforms for the ROKAF with a budget of $725 million.

The ROKAF uses two Dassault Falcon-2000S and four BAE Systems Hawker RC-800 SIGINT gathering aircraft. The Falcon-2000S jets were delivered in 2017. The RC-800 aircraft are slightly older, entering service in the early 2000s. DPPC plans call for four of the RC-800s to be replaced with the new SIGINT acquisition.

Wavebands

Both the Falcon-2000S and RC-800s are believed to gather Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) at the operational, and possibly strategic, levels. To this end, they are thought to collect COMINT/ELINT across 500 megahertz to 40 gigahertz wavebands. This intelligence maybe analysed onboard by electronic warfare specialists and/or transmitted across air-to-ground datalinks.

It is reasonable to assume that the ROKAF may choose to procure at least four new aircraft to replace the same number of RC-800s. The force could spend up to $175 million on each aircraft with a residual $25 million covering training and other ancillary costs. Local reports state that the first new SIGINT aircraft could enter service in 2026.

The Republic of Korea Air Force is looking for new signals intelligence aircraft to replace its existing RC-800 jets. (L3Harris)

Analysis: Wishful Thinking

Forthcoming USAF platforms such as the B-21 Raider strategic bomber maybe yet more resistant to radar detection than present day low-RCS platforms (USAF)

The People’s Republic of China has made grandiose claims for the performance of its JY-27A ground-based air surveillance radar. They should be treated with caution.

An article published in the Global Times, an offshoot of the People’s Daily, itself a mouthpiece for the People’s Republic of China’s ruling Communist Party, claimed on 28 May that the country’s new CETC JY-27A Very High Frequency (VHF: 30 megahertz/MHz to 300MHz) can detect aircraft with a low Radar Cross Section (RCS). The article said that, not only can the radar detect such aircraft, but can “guide missiles to destroy them.”

Low frequency radars detecting low RCS aircraft is not a new claim. This principle has been known for decades and has already been exploited in radars like Russia’s NNIIRT 1L119 Nebo-SVU VHF system. The long wavelength signals transmitted by VHF radars have meant that while low-RCS aircraft maybe detectable, they may not be detectable with the sharp precision required to guide an Air-to-Air Missile (AAM) or Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) to its target. Put simply, this is why many fighter radars, ground- and ship-based fire control radars and missile radar seekers transmit in frequencies from X-band (8.5 gigahertz/GHz to 10.68GHz) and above. What these radars lose in detection range, compared to lower frequency radars, they make up for in precision. The Global Times article claimed that Chinese radar engineers have solved this precision deficit by networking together several radars positioned a known distance from one another, looking at the same patch of sky in different directions to determine an aircraft’s location. Once detected it could be possible to guide “long-range anti-aircraft missiles” to perform precision strikes on these targets.

Networked Radars

Distributed, networked radars to counter stealth is an established concept. The electronic warfare and radar expert Dr. Carlo Kopp discussed this approach in his seminal 2012 article in Defence Today entitled ‘Advancing Counter-Stealth Radar Technology’. He asserted that “Defeating stealth targets using networking and data fusion presupposes that some radars can see the target some of the time, also that the target’s stealth is considerably poorer in some directions compared to others, and finally that the target is visible to radars from varying aspects.” Basically, a low RCS aircraft may have a low radar signature when viewed from head on, of from a particular angle but not an equally low signature in all directions. By scattering and networking several antennas across a wide area, one of the antennas may get a lucky glimpse of part of the aircraft which is not so stealthy and thus detect it. Dr. Kopp adds that for this to be effective, the non-stealthy part of the aircraft needs to be visible to that particular radar for some time. An aircraft flying into hostile airspace is unlikely to hang around and may be travelling at very high speeds, thus only exposing itself to the radar for a very short time. To further complicate matters, aircraft such as the US Air Force’s Northrop Grumman B-2A Spirit strategic bomber and Lockheed Martin F/A-22A Raptor air superiority fighter use ‘all-aspect’ RCS reduction techniques. This means that they are stealthy regardless of the angle from which they are viewed by radar. Future US aircraft, such as the forthcoming Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider strategic bomber are likely to have even better RCS reduction design configurations.

Dr. Kopp concedes that “a networked data fusion system (fusing data from several distributed radars) is thus not a panacea, but is potentially quite effective against stealth designs that do not have genuine ‘all aspect’ stealth capability.” There is an additional problem. Airframe limitations mean that low-RCS aircraft cannot be designed to defeat all radar transmission wavelengths. Instead, airframes are optimised to defeat the radar systems most likely to be used for the precision detection of such a target and for fire control. This typically includes radars transmitting in S-band (2.3GHz to 2.5GHz/2.7GHz to 3.7GHz) and above. To summarise, a network of VHF radars maybe capable of detecting an aircraft with a low RCS but lacking all-aspect stealth, yet weapons still have to be guided with precision to the target. This is where a fighter aircraft’s X-band radar would come into play, or the guidance radars and radar seekers used by AAMs or SAMs transmitting in X-band and above. These are precisely the frequencies that low-RCS aircraft are designed to defeat. Networked VHF radars may give you a good fix on where the aircraft is in the sky, but the missile’s end game still depends on higher frequency radars which stealth aircraft are designed to outfox.

Arguably this could be overcome by a salvo launch of SAMs and AAMs into the area of sky where the aircraft is thought to be. This might not be done with too much precision, but a load of missiles could be launched ballistically with the hope of scoring a lucky hit. It could prove an expensive tactic as it would potentially waste missiles at an early stage of a conflict, the moment when low-RCS aircraft are most likely to be used.

Jamming

Moreover, these VHF radars, and fire control radars operating in higher wavebands would almost certainly be subjected to heavy electronic attack at the outset of a conflict. Aircraft such as the F/A-22A, B-2A, B-21 or Lockheed Martin’s F-35A/B/C Lightning-II fighters would be accompanied by jamming platforms like the US Navy’s E/A-18G Growler aircraft as they fly into contested airspace. The Block-2 Low Band Jammer (LBJ) segment of the latter aircraft’s Next Generation Jammer, which replaces its current Harris AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming system, is thought to cover a waveband of 100 megahertz to two gigahertz. The US Navy is currently selecting a vendor for the Block-2 LBJ with a team comprising Northrop Grumman and Harris, and L3 vying for selection. While VHF radars like the JY-27A maybe trying to detect low RCS aircraft, they will be a prime target for both escort and stand-off jamming for aircraft like the E/A-18G. They will also be high priority targets for kinetic weapons. Given the frequencies they use, VHF radars tend to be big. In the case of the JY-27A PRC officials have hinted that several radars are required to detect low RCS aircraft. Such targets could show up well on aerial reconnaissance imagery. They also need to transmit, and once transmitting, will reveal their position to ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) gathering assets such as the US Air Force’s Boeing RC-135U Combat Sent aircraft. Once their position is betrayed, electronic and kinetic attack can be brought to bear.

Conclusions

The PRC maybe feeling emboldened by the development of the JY-27A and its touted capabilities. The death of low RCS airframe design has been predicted umpteen times since the B-2A and Lockheed Martin F-117A Nighthawk ground attack aircraft debuted in service in 1997 and 1983 respectively. The possible shortcomings of such radars are no excuse to be complacent, and such systems should be high priority electronic and kinetic targets at the start of any conflict. The JY-27A’s attributes may be accompanied with a healthy serving of hyperbole, but that is no excuse for complacency.

All At Sea

A variant of the FlyingFish SIGINT system will equip the UK’s forthcoming IOD-3 AMBER satellite. (Horizon Technologies)

The growing provision of private-sector signals intelligence gathering will take an important step forward with the launch of the UK’s IOD-3 AMBER CubeSat in 2020.

The IOD-3 AMBER will be the first of a constellation of satellites providing a global Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) footprint to enhance maritime security for the British government. While the exact number of satellites that will eventually be launched has not been revealed, it is expected to include less than ten spacecraft.

The satellites will possess both an L-band (1.3 gigahertz/GHz to 1.7GHz) and Automatic Identification System (AIS: 161.975 megahertz/MHz to 162.025MHz) SIGINT packages. This is derived from Horizon Technologies’ FlyingFish COMINT-gathering system. FlyingFish routinely equips aircraft particularly maritime surveillance, maritime patrol and signals intelligence-gathering platforms. These furnish several NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) navies, coastguards and border protection agencies. The L-band equipment will detect Satellite Communications (COMINT) from vessels across a waveband of one gigahertz to two gigahertz. AIS is mandated by the International Maritime Organisation for all vessels displacing in excess of 300 tonnes.

AIS transponders equipping vessels transmit an array of regarding a vessel’s voyage, identity and location. By correlating the AIS and the source of the L-band SATCOM it becomes possible to cross reference both sets of transmissions and match them to a vessel’s location. X-band (7.9-8.4GHz to 7.25GHz/7.75GHz) downlink and S-band (two to four gigahertz) SATCOM COMINT receivers will also be carried. Interestingly the concept of operations used for the constellation does not require a number of satellites to receive transmissions and then triangulate the position of a vessel, based upon signal’s time difference of arrival at each satellite. Instead, the IOD-3 uses “a new proprietary geolocation technology which does not include groups of satellites ‘flying in formation’” to perform direction-finding, notes John Beckner, chief executive officer of Horizon Technologies.

Why is such technology needed? The high seas are home to criminal activities whether that be narcotics or people smuggling, illegal fishing or environmental damage. Sometimes such activities are betrayed by a vessel switching off its AIS transponder, or altering its transmissions. This can have the effect of making the vessel appear in a different location, or to be moving at speeds not routinely associated with marine traffic. Should AIS transmissions be spotted from a vessel that seems to be in two locations, the simultaneous collection of SATCOM COMINT will indicate the likely real location of the ship: SATCOM transmissions will not, for example, also be coming from the false position. The version of the Flying Fish COMINT system equipping the satellite can also demodulate L-band SATCOM transmissions. This means that users can directly listen to these communications. This is important for gathering intelligence on what the targeted vessel maybe doing. Secondly, AIS can be switched off by a vessel. Should this happen and then SATCOM be initiated, this could reveal that the vessel is engaged in suspect, or illegal activity. From a humanitarian perspective monitoring L-band SATCOM can enable the user to instantly receive distress calls and to immediately organise assistance given that the vessel’s location can be determined through its SATCOM and AIS transmissions. For example, satellite phones using the Thuraya (1.525GHz to 1.661GHz) network are routinely used by people smugglers in the Mediterranean. The phones are often the only means of communications with the outside world that boats carrying refugees have. In this context, aircraft equipped with the Flying Fish payload have helped saved numerous lives by intercepting distress calls from these craft when they run into trouble.

The IOD-3 Amber satellite will transmit its SIGINT to the Goonhilly teleport in southwest England. There, the data will be analysed using Horizon Technologies’ AMBER Ground Exploitation System. The IOD-3 will be launched from the International Space Station (ISS) in 2020. The satellite bus has been developed by AAC Clyde Space. Several undisclosed UK government agencies will receive the SIGINT collected by the satellites. The capability is being procured via a public-private partnership: Horizon Technologies and AAC Clyde has joined forces with the UK’s Satellite Applications Catapult technology incubator and Nanoracks which is organising the launch from the ISS. Meanwhile, the British government is funding the initiative and will be the customer for the intelligence.

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